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Ending the Invalidity Shell Game:
Stabilizing the Application of the Written
Description Requirement in Patent
Litigation
Aaron B. Rabinowitz*
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the recent battles fought over whether particular
inventions are patent-eligible,1 one might be forgiven for
overlooking the other requirements for patentability. The
written description requirement mandates that the
specification of the patent application shall “contain a written
description of the invention,”2 which
[A]llows the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to
examine applications effectively; courts to understand the invention,
determine compliance with the statute, and to construe the claims;
and the public to understand and improve upon the invention and to
avoid the claimed boundaries of the patentee’s exclusive rights.3

While issued patents are presumed valid and can only be
invalidated upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence,4
© 2011 Aaron B. Rabinowitz.
* Associate, Woodcock Washburn LLP, Philadelphia, PA. Former law clerk to
the Honorable Franklin S. Van Antwerpen, United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit and to the Honorable Jan E. DuBois, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Aliza Rabinowitz for
her love and support and to Ronen and Orli Rabinowitz for keeping the author
on schedule. The views expressed in this article are solely the author’s and do
not necessarily represent those of the author’s employers, colleagues, or
clients.
1. E.g., In re Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (June 28, 2010) (assessing
patentability of methods of hedging investment risk); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. USPTO, 09-CV-4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 2, 2010) (assessing patentability of breast cancer genes).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
598 F.3d 1336, 1345–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (affirming that 35 U.S.C. §
112 contains a written description requirement separate from the enablement
and best mode requirements).
3. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1345.
4. E.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367,
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nearly half of all litigated patents are nonetheless adjudged
invalid.5 An analysis of federal court patent decisions issued in
the last ten years reveals that those (typically accused
infringers) who challenge issued patents on the ground of
insufficient written description succeed more than forty percent
of the time in their challenges.6
The fact that the federal courts so frequently overturn
granted patents that (1) have been thoroughly vetted by the
PTO and (2) can only be invalidated by a showing of clear and
convincing evidence7 underscores that there is a disconnect
between the way in which the PTO evaluates—and approves—
patent applications and the way in which those approved
patents are treated in litigation.8
This has created what can be termed a “shell game” for
patentees that assert their patents in litigation. Having
confidence in their PTO-approved patent claims, patentees bet
on the strengths of those patents by initiating litigation against
infringers, only to discover in litigation that their patents are
invalid based on written descriptions that the PTO concluded
were sufficient.
The causes of this problem are likely at least twofold. First,
the law of written description is ever-evolving, and there is still
internal debate within the Federal Circuit regarding the scope
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (establishing a
presumption of patent validity).
5. Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 SW. U.
L. REV. 323, 326 n.10 (2008) (citing Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 76 (2005)). While patents may be
invalidated for any number of reasons (e.g., lack of novelty, obviousness,
failure to disclose best mode), this paper focuses on the issue of patents
invalidated for failure to comply with the written description requirement of
35 U.S.C. § 112.
6. This analysis is based on summary patent litigation statistics for
2000–2009, available at www.patstats.org. See infra section IV.
7. E.g., Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1375; see also 35 U.S.C. § 282
(establishing a presumption of patent validity).
8. This 40% figure is also in tension with suggestions that the written
description doctrine has not had much of an impact on patent litigation. E.g.,
Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A
Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the
Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 80 (2007); see also Dennis F.
Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement
in Patent Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 382, 383 (2010)
(observing that written description requirement plays little role in patent
prosecution before the PTO).
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and purpose of the requirement.9 Second, courts may encounter
difficulty in applying the presumption of validity in the
litigation context because the PTO need not necessarily explain
how a given patent claim satisfied the written description
requirement.10 While the disconnect between the PTO and the
courts may have more than one cause, the fact that courts
frequently agree with patent challengers suggests that courts
are implicitly applying an incorrect evidentiary standard.
This disconnect is a matter of importance to both patentees
and to the public. First, the frequency with which courts apply
the written description requirement to overturn patents stands
as a clear disincentive for firms to invest in patentable research
that may benefit the public. Second, the frequent invalidation
of patents on some grounds (i.e., written description) that was
necessarily evaluated by the PTO11 suggests that the PTO’s
evaluation of patent applications is flawed.
This paper examines this disconnect and proposes a
solution to harmonize the application of the written description
requirement at the PTO and in the courts. This solution
empowers patent applicants and the PTO to more consistently
produce patents that possess claims that satisfy the written
description requirement and are more likely to be upheld in
litigation.
To frame the issues surrounding the current state of the
law on written description, Part II of this paper reviews the
evolution of the written description requirement from its
origins as a device to prevent applicants from adding improper
“new matter” to their patent claims to its current incarnation
as a device used to invalidate patent claims that lack sufficient
support in the specification. A statistical review of federal court
decisions issued from 2000–2009 that apply the written
9. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Univ.
of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1325 (Linn, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe
Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc); see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1361–67 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Rader, J., dissenting).
10. Because written descriptions are presumed to be adequate, examiners
need only comment on the written description when they believe it is deficient.
See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2163.04, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm.
11. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2006); MPEP § 2163(II)(A)(2).
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description requirement is provided in Part IV of this paper,
which demonstrates the prevalence of written description
issues in patent litigation.
Part V of this paper proposes a way to harmonize the
PTO’s written description analysis of patent applications with
the way in which the federal courts assess the written
description of granted patents, namely by having patent
applicants affirmatively identify during prosecution the written
description support for their claims. Part V of this paper also
discusses the likely benefits of this solution and some of the
solution’s likely criticisms. Finally, Part VI of this paper
provides additional commentary and observations on the state
of written description law.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
The written description doctrine carries the same weight in
patentability determinations as any of the other three
requirements for patentability.12 But because the contours of
the written description have changed over time, compliance
with the requirement presents a puzzle for patent applicants
and the courts alike.
The written description requirement originated as a device
to prevent patent applicants from adding new inventions to an
already-existing disclosure.13 In more recent decisions,
however, the Federal Circuit has changed course and applied
the written description requirement as a tool to protect against
inadequate disclosure. In this new incarnation, the written
description is applied to claims, including originally-filed
claims, to assess whether the patent specification adequately
discloses or supports the subject matter recited in the claims.14

12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2006).
13. See Univ. of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1307 (Rader, J., dissenting)
(collecting cases).
14. E.g., LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336,
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (concluding that originally-filed claims lacked written
description support).

121_RABINOWITZ.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

4/4/2011 8:04 AM

ENDING THE INVALIDITY SHELL GAME

131

A. HISTORY OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
As the Federal Circuit recently reiterated:

[T]he purpose of the written description requirement is to “ensure
that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does
not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of
art as described in the patent specification.” It is part of the quid pro
quo of the patent grant and ensures that the public receives a
meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing
an invention for a period of time.15

At the outset of modern patent law, the doctrine was used
to police priority.16 During the early development of the patent
law, 35 U.S.C. § 132 was used to enforce the prohibition against
adding material to patent claims that was not present in the
originally-filed application: “[n]o amendment shall introduce
new matter into the disclosure of the invention.”17 The Federal
Circuit then adapted 35 U.S.C. § 112 to police priority in In re
Ruschig.18
In Ruschig, the applicant added a new claim to the
application about a year after the application was filed.19 The
court then determined whether the new claim was supported
by the disclosure in the applicant’s original application.20
Instead of using § 132 to police this priority question, however,
the Ruschig court applied § 112 to analyze priority and “calved”
a new written description doctrine out of the enablement
requirement of § 112.21
In In re Wertheim,22 the court again addressed a priority
issue. Applying the written description doctrine, the court
reiterated that “[t]he function of the description requirement is
to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date
of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later
claimed by him.”23 In later cases, the U.S. Court of Customs
15. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353–54 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Univ. of Rochester v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); Holman, supra note 8, at 4–
6.
16. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976–89 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006).
18. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
19. Id. at 991.
20. Id. at 992–96.
21. Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 978 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
22. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
23. Id. at 262.
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and Patent Appeals and then the Federal Circuit continued to
apply the written description requirement only for purposes of
policing priority.24
B. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. ELI LILLY,
INCORPORATED—CREATING A “FREE-STANDING DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENT”
In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly,
Incorporated,25 however, the Federal Circuit applied the
written description requirement not to police priority, but
instead as a “new free-standing disclosure requirement.”26
In Lilly, the claims at issue recited recombinant plasmids
and microorganisms that produce human insulin, which is
protein involved in the regulation of sugar metabolism.27 One of
the claims at issue recited “a nucleotide sequence having the
structure of the reverse transcript [i.e., cDNA] of an mRNA of a
[human], which mRNA encodes insulin.”28 The specification,
however, provided “only a general method for obtaining the
human cDNA (it incorporates by reference the method used to
obtain the rat cDNA) along with the amino acid sequences of
human insulin A and B chains.”29 The court concluded that,
whether or not that disclosure was enabling, the general
disclosure regarding rat insulin “[did] not provide a written
description of the cDNA encoding human insulin . . . .”30 Judge
Lourie explained that the cDNA described in the specification
was:
[N]ot itself a written description of that DNA; it conveys no
distinguishing information concerning its identity. While the example
provides a process for obtaining human insulin-encoding cDNA, there

24. See In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The test for
determining compliance with the written description requirement is whether
the disclosure of the application as originally filed reasonably conveys to the
artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed
subject matter, rather than the presence or absence of literal support in the
specification for the claim language.”); see also Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at
978–80 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
25. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly, Inc., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997).
26. Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 980 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
27. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562.
28. Id. at 1567 (second alteration in original).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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is no further information in the patent pertaining to that cDNA’s
relevant structural or physical characteristics; in other words, it thus
does not describe human insulin cDNA. Describing a method of
preparing a cDNA or even describing the protein that the cDNA
encodes, as the example does, does not necessarily describe the cDNA
itself. No sequence information indicating which nucleotides
constitute human cDNA appears in the patent . . . .31

Because the specification lacked such sequence information,
the Federal Circuit held the claim invalid.32 The Lilly
patentee’s other claims generically recited cDNA encoding
vertebrate insulin (claims 1 and 2), cDNA encoding mammalian
insulin (claim 4), and cDNA encoding vertebrate insulin (claims
6 and 7).33 The patentee argued that the disclosure of a species
(the rat insulin-encoding cDNA) within the scope of those
generic claims satisfied the written description requirement.34
The court, however, disagreed:
[A] description of rat insulin cDNA is not a description of the broad
classes of vertebrate or mammalian insulin cDNA. A written
description of an invention involving a chemical genus, like a
description of a chemical species, ‘requires a precise definition, such
as by structure, formula, [or] chemical name,’ of the claimed subject
matter sufficient to distinguish it from other materials.35

This result was notable for at least two reasons. First, the
Federal Circuit had applied the written description
requirement—historically used to prevent applicants from
later-claiming matter not included in the original
application36—to the patentee’s originally-filed claims.37
Second, the biotechnology community was also concerned about
the “stringent disclosure requirements” the decision had
imposed on biotechnology inventions.38
The free-standing disclosure requirement developed in
Lilly and its subsequent application by the Federal Circuit in
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,39 University of Rochester
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. U.S. Patent No. 4,652,525 col.20 l.64 (filed June 28, 1983).
34. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
35. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d. 1164,
1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
36. See supra Part II.A.
37. Holman, supra note 8, at 14.
38. Id.
39. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo I), 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (applying Lilly and concluding that a deposit of DNA material did
not satisfy the written description requirement for claim directed to a DNA
sequence, when the application did not contain a written recitation of the
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v. G. D. Searle, Inc.,40 and LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource
Mapping, Inc.41 generated significant tension among the
Federal Circuit’s judges. Each of those cases applied the Lilly
approach to written description to invalidate claims for lack of
sufficient disclosure in the patent specification.42 In each of
these three cases, the patentee petitioned for rehearing en
banc, and rehearing was denied in all three cases over vigorous
dissents from Judges Gajarsa, Linn, and Rader.43 The Lilly
approach to written description quickly expanded beyond the
complex biotechnology invention at issue in that case. The
“free-standing” disclosure requirement has since been applied
outside of biotechnology to fields such as medical devices,44
computer graphics,45 and beverage cans.46

sequence). After Enzo petitioned for panel rehearing, the Enzo I panel vacated
its original decision and remanded for analysis of whether a patentee could
comply with the written description requirement if the deposits “indicate that
the patentee has invented species sufficient to constitute the genera.” Enzo
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956, 967–70 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
40. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
41. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
42. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir.
2009), aff’d en banc 598 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Linn, J., concurring);
LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Univ. of
Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1325 (Linn, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); MOBA, B.V. v. Diamond
Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader, J., concurring);
id. at 1327 (Bryson, J., concurring); Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 976 (Rader, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 987 (Linn, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
43. LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc); Univ. of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1307 (Rader, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1325 (Linn, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc); Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 976 (Rader, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc).
44. ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
45. LizardTech, 424 F.3d 1336.
46. Crown Packaging Tech. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 531 F. Supp. 2d
629 (D. Del. 2008).
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C. ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS47—REAFFIRMING LILLY
While the Federal Circuit seemed to retract the Lilly
doctrine in Enzo II,48 the court ultimately affirmed in Ariad
that the written description requirement could be used to police
priority and–—as in Lilly–—could also be used to invalidate
claims for lack of supporting disclosure in the specification.49
The patent claims at issue in Ariad concerned the use of
reducing the activity of the NF-kB transcription factor present
in cells to regulate the expression of genes (e.g., genes that code
for cytokines, which can harm the body if present in excess
amounts).50 The patent specification recited the goal of
reducing NF-kB activity and reducing the binding between NFkB and NF-kB binding sites in cells.51 The specification
“hypothesize[d] three types of molecules with the potential to
reduce [NF-kB] activity in cells: decoy, dominantly interfering,
and specific inhibitor molecules.”52 A panel decision invalidated
Ariad’s claims on the ground that the specification did not
actually describe the molecules that reduced the binding
between the NF-kB molecules and the NF-kB binding sites.53
On Ariad’s petition for rehearing, the en banc Federal
Circuit granted the petition to determine whether 35 U.S.C. §
112 contained a “written description requirement separate from
the enablement requirement and, if so, the scope and purpose
of that requirement.”54
Before turning to the merits of the case,55 Judge Lourie
noted that while the written description requirement had
historically been used to police priority:
Ariad provides no principled basis for restricting that requirement to
establishing priority. Certainly nothing in the language of § 112
supports such a restriction; the statute does not say ‘[t]he
specification shall contain a written description of the invention for
purposes of determining priority.’ And although the issue arises

47. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
49. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349.
50. Id. at 1340.
51. Id. at 1341.
52. Id.
53. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
aff’d en banc 598 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
54. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340.
55. The Ariad en banc court ultimately determined that the written
description requirement exists separately from the enablement requirement,
an issue which is outside the scope of this paper.
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primarily in cases involving priority, Congress has not so limited the
statute, and neither will we.56

Judge Lourie also took the opportunity to address the longstanding test for written description, namely that the
description must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the
art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.”57
Put another way, the accepted test was whether “the disclosure
of the application relied upon ‘reasonably conveys to [those
skilled in the art] that the inventor had possession at that time
of the later claimed subject matter.’”58
Acknowledging that “[t]he term ‘possession,’ however, has
never been very enlightening,”59 Judge Lourie then concluded
that:
[W]hatever the specific articulation, the test requires an objective
inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective
of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the
specification must describe an invention understandable to that
skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the
invention claimed.60

The en banc court then adopted, in full, the reasoning of the
earlier panel decision and affirmed the invalidity of Ariad’s
claims for failure to comply with the written description
requirement.61
Judges Rader and Linn dissented from the Ariad en banc
opinion.62 The dissenting judges first criticized the majority’s
reaffirmation of the “fabrication,” begun in Lilly, that written
description was not limited to policing new matters and was
instead a free-standing requirement.63 The dissenting judges
also rightly criticized the Ariad-Lilly application of written
description as “in tension” with the Federal Circuit’s approach
to claim construction.64
In claim construction, claims are read “in view of the

56. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349.
57. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
58. Id. (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570,
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
59. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1354.
62. Id. at 1361–67 (Rader, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1363–64.
64. Id. at 1364.
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specification” to determine their meaning and scope.65 In Judge
Rader’s view, “If this court followed its own rule [from claim
construction] and ensured that claims do not enlarge what the
inventor has described, then the claims would never have a
scope that exceeds the disclosure in the rest of the
specification.”66 Given that under principles of claim
construction, claims could never be construed to encompass any
more than what is disclosed in the specification, courts would
never find that a claim “lacks support” in the patent
application.67 Judge Rader observed that “this court’s new
written description doctrine only has meaning if this court
ignores its own claim construction rules.”68 The dissent
concluded by arguing that “[a]s it stands, the court’s
inadequate description of its written description requirement
acts as a wildcard on which the court may rely when it faces a
patent that it feels is unworthy of protection.”69
Thus, while the Ariad en banc decision clarified that the
written description requirement could be used as a freestanding disclosure requirement, the decision nonetheless left
somewhat open the precise standard under which patent claims
should be evaluated. Rather than providing bright-line
guidance, the decision stated only that the written description
inquiry required an “objective inquiry into the four corners of
the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary
skill in the art,” leaving the analysis of an individual patent up
to the specific facts of that case.
III. THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND WRITTEN
DESCRIPTION
Aside from the turbulence in the law of written description,
the presumption of validity that attaches to all granted patents
is a second layer of complexity courts confront when analyzing
patent claims for compliance with written description. Issued
65. Id. at 1364–65 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
66. Id. at 1365.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1366; see also LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433
F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc) (characterizing Federal Circuit’s approach to written
description issues as “[b]ring your specifications to the Federal Circuit and we
will tell you if they contain sufficient descriptions.”).
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patents are presumed valid—a challenger cannot overturn a
patent without showing that the patent is invalid by clear and
convincing evidence.70 Taken literally, the presumption means
that courts must give deference to the PTO in all cases, even
where the court itself may disagree with the PTO’s ultimate
conclusion on patentability:
A patent is presumed valid and invalidity must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. . . . It is quite possible that [a] patent should
have never been granted, but once it was granted, attacking its
validity is a very difficult task indeed. . . . [T]he law is the law.71

The presumption of validity and the attendant clear and
convincing evidentiary standard are squarely in play when a
challenger in litigation bases its invalidity theory on prior art
that was already reviewed by the PTO: “[w]hen no prior art
other than that which was considered by the PTO examiner is
relied on by the attacker, he has the added burden of
overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government
agency presumed to have properly done its job . . . .”72 Hence,
“[w]hen an attacker simply goes over the same ground travelled
by the PTO, part of the burden is to show that the PTO was
wrong in its decision to grant the patent.”73
This same analysis should also apply in the written
description context to require courts to give proper deference to
the PTO’s conclusions on written description. The PTO is
obligated by rule to review the specification during prosecution
to determine the claim’s compliance with the written
description requirement.74 Given that the written description
70. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
71. Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin Ltd., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 48246, at *144, *150 (E.D. Va. July 17, 2006).
72. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed.
Cir. 1984). Some have questioned whether the same standards should apply
in court when the PTO did not review the evidence that a challenger is using
to support a theory of invalidity. In a recent petition to rehear a case en banc,
Microsoft urged the court to overrule its precedents that require clear and
convincing evidence of invalidity when the PTO did not consider the art at
issue. Lucent v. Gateway, Inc., Federal Circuit Appeal Nos. 2008-1485, -1487,
-1495, Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8–14 (filed Oct. 13, 2009)
(on file with author); see also Doug Lichtman & Mark Lemley, Rethinking
Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 49–50 (2007).
73. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360.
74. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (2010); see also MPEP § 2163(II)(A)(2) (“[T]he
examiner should review the claims and the entire specification, including the
specific embodiments, figures, and sequence listings, to understand how
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analysis encompasses only the claims and the specification,75 a
written description-based challenge asserted in litigation could
be considered as going “over the same ground travelled by the
PTO . . . .”76
Part of the challenge facing the courts, however, is that
while the PTO must review all patent claims for compliance
with the written description requirement,77 the PTO does not
as a matter of course make findings regarding written
description.78 This presents a practical problem for reviewing
courts: when a challenger raises an issue that was considered
by the PTO during prosecution, the challenger’s burden is to
show that the PTO’s reasoning on that issue was incorrect and
overcome the deference the court must give to the PTO’s
reasoning.79 But it is difficult to see how a court can properly
defer to the PTO’s reasoning when the PTO concludes that the
claims satisfy written description requirements but do not
supply express reasoning to educate the court (and the public)
regarding precisely how the patent claims and specification
satisfy the requirement.80
Where the PTO does not make any findings or “[w]hen new
evidence touching validity of the patent not considered by the
PTO is relied on, the tribunal considering it is not faced with
applicant provides support for the various features of the claimed invention.”).
75. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
aff’d en banc 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that the written
description analysis addresses only the claims and the “four corners” of the
specification).
76. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360.
77. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (2010); see also MPEP § 2163(II)(A)(2).
78. See, e.g., PIN/NIP v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1225, 1243 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (“[A] patent issued by the PTO is presumed to be valid.”); Brooktree
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977 F.2d 1555, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he
fact that the Patent Office allows . . . an amendment without objection thereto
as new matter (within the meaning of Title 35 U.S.C. § 132) is entitled to an
especially weighty presumption of correctness” (citation omitted)).
79. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360.
80. See PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem., 304 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(highlighting the problems that can result from the lack of express reasoning
from the PTO. Specifically, the PTO allowed the patentee’s claims on the first
office action, but in subsequent litigation the Federal Circuit reversed a jury
verdict that one of the allowed claims complied with the written description
requirement. Thus, the patentee may have been penalized in litigation for
claims that—in the PTO’s judgment—comply with written description because
there will be no PTO findings a court can review and defer to). Cf. Am. Hoist,
725 F.2d at 1360 (observing that court is normally required to defer to PTO’s
reasoning and expertise).
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having to disagree with the PTO or with deferring to its
judgment or with taking its expertise into account.”81 This may
mean that courts likely have trouble appreciating that the
written description of a granted patent can only be overturned
by clear and convincing evidence even in the absence of any
express findings by the PTO, which may explain why written
description challenges so frequently go the way of the
challenger.82
Thus, in any given case, a court must contend with (1) the
uncertainty in the ever-evolving law surrounding written
description and (2) the challenge of properly considering the
presumption of validity when the court may or may not have
express findings from the PTO to which the court can defer.
Given the layers of complexity surrounding written description,
it is no surprise that the courts have encountered significant
challenges in properly applying the requirement in litigation,
as described in the next section of this paper.
IV. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION—PLAYING A LEADING ROLE
IN LITIGATION
A. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION OUTCOMES
IN LITIGATION
Some commentators have suggested that the written
description requirement does not ultimately play much of a role
in patent validity.83 During en banc oral arguments in Ariad,
Chief Judge Michel stated that:
I can’t remember ever seeing a patent office rejection that was based
only on the failure of written description. I’m not saying there aren’t
any, but the flow of cases that come through this court at three or
four hundred a year, it’s exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs
its case on written description. I can’t remember a single case.84

A follow-up study revealed that Judge Michel’s comment was
correct.85
81. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360.
82. See Infra Part IV.
83. Holman, supra note 8, at 80; see also Crouch, supra note 8, at 396
(observing that written description requirement plays little role in patent
prosecution before the PTO).
84. Recording of Oral Argument at 23:58–24:18, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli
Lilly
&
Co.,
598
F.3d
1336
(2010),
available
at
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov.
85. As detailed in the follow-up study, not one of 2,858 Board of Patent
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In contrast to its limited effect in prosecution, written
description has played a critical role in patent litigation. A
review of the courts’ application of the written description
requirement reveals strikingly different results than what is
seen in prosecution. First, litigation statistics reveal that
written description issues arise in a significant number of
cases.86 A review of patent litigation data87 reveals that over
2000–2009, parties that attacked a patent on written
description grounds succeeded more than forty percent of the
time (Table 1).
Table 1: Success of Attack on Written Description
Grounds
Year88

Challenger
Prevails

2000
2004
52%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Average

35%

43%

25%

39%

37%

43%

Thus, despite the fact that the PTO is obligated to assess
the written description of a patent and that a granted patent
can only be invalidated by a showing of clear and convincing
evidence, parties that attacked a patent on written description
grounds nonetheless succeed two out of every five attempts.
This is a surprising result, given that the PTO is obligated to
Appeals and Inferences (BPAI) decisions sustained an outcome-determinative
written description requirement rejection of originally-filed claims; the
twenty-three BPAI decisions that did have an outcome-determinative written
description decision “involved the rejection of claims that had been added or
amended during prosecution and addressed the concern that the added
limitations were not properly described in the original specification.” Crouch,
supra note 8, at 394.
86. For example, in 2009 alone, written description issues arose in 30
different
patent
litigations.
U.S.
PAT.
LITIG.
STAT.,
http://www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html (last visited July 8, 2010).
87. These data are from www.patstats.org, an organization at the
University of Houston. Patstats.org provides research information on patent
law decisions dating back to 2000, and tracks cases and outcomes on an issuespecific basis (e.g., obviousness, infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents). Id.
88. These data were calculated by reviewing statistics from
www.patstats.org. For example, the 37% figure in 2009 was calculated by
dividing the number of written description decisions in 2009 (11) that favored
the patent challenger by the total number (11 + 19 = 30) of written description
challenges in 2009, i.e., 11 / (19 + 11) = 37%. Full Calendar Year 2009 Report,
U.S. PAT. LITIG. STAT., http://www.patstats.org/2009_full_year_posting.htm
(last visited July 2, 2010).
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review the claims and specification for compliance with the
written description requirement,89 and that patent validity can
only be disproved by clear and convincing evidence.90
B. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THESE LITIGATION OUTCOMES
That nearly half of all written description issues are
decided in favor of the challenger suggests that courts are—
perhaps involuntarily—operating as if the PTO’s conclusion
that a patent claim satisfied written description can be
overturned by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., 51%
probable) rather than by the applicable clear and convincing
standard (i.e., 70% probable).91 These data suggest that (1)
something is amiss with the written description “strength” of
patents that the PTO is allowing, (2) the courts are
misapplying the law of written description, (3) the courts are
misapplying the evidentiary burdens to validity challenges, or
(4) some combination of these.92
Any or all of the foregoing may be the culprit for the
current state of written description law. First, the fact that
written description figures so infrequently into the PTO’s
decisions to grant patentability93 may mean that the PTO itself
is not applying enough written description scrutiny to patent
applications. Without being “battle-tested” during prosecution,
granted patent applications then become susceptible to written
description challenges during litigation.
The complexity in the law and the Federal Circuit’s own
internal inconsistency may contribute to the challenges that

89. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (2010); MPEP § 2163(II)(A).
90. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1986).
91. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 1978)
(Weinstein, J.) (noting that the “clear and convincing” standard requires 70%
probability); Note, Due Process Comes Due: An Argument for the Clear and
Convincing Evidentiary Standard in Sentencing Hearings, 77 IOWA L. REV.
1803, 1804 n.11 (1992).
92. To place the data in proper perspective, the 43% “win rate” by
challengers means that the patentee wins on written description issues 57% of
the time. See supra Part IV (A). This 57% figure, however, is closer to the 50%
win rate that would be expected if the courts were applying a preponderance
standard than to the 70% win rate that would be expected if the courts were
applying the clear and convincing standard. See Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 405.
93. Crouch, supra note 8, at 396 (observing that written description
requirement plays little role in patent prosecution before the PTO).
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the written description poses to litigants and judges alike
during litigation. First, the en banc Federal Circuit has
recognized that the existing “possession”94 standard for
compliance with written description has “never been very
enlightening.”95 Thus, the contours of the test are hazy by the
court’s own admission. Second, the fact that courts may
construe claims to be broader than the scope of the
specification’s preferred embodiments96 has arguably created a
situation where courts are given “unfettered power to err
twice—both in construing the claims so broad as to exceed the
scope of the rest of the specification and then to invalidate
those claims because it reads the specification as failing to
‘support’ [the] court’s own broad conception of the claimed
subject matter.”97
No matter which of the foregoing is the cause of the
problem, the end result for patentees is that their patents are
overly susceptible to invalidation on written description
grounds. This is of concern to the PTO and to patent applicants,
as it is a clear disincentive for firms to invest in research that
may be beneficial to society at large: firms may,
understandably, become fearful that their patents may be
invalidated in litigation.
While the presumption of validity and the attendant “clear
and convincing” evidentiary standard may exist, courts have
difficulty applying the doctrine in litigation, particularly where
there is no express reasoning by the PTO to which the court
can defer. As a practical matter, while “[t]he court must give
deference to the PTO’s reasoning in its decisions”98 it is
difficult, if not impossible, to see how courts can give proper
deference to the PTO without the court always having before it

94. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009),
aff’d en banc 598 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining the
“possession” test as “whether the disclosure of the application relied upon
reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession
of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date”).
95. Id.
96. E.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (“[T]his court has expressly rejected the contention that if a patent
describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be
construed as being limited to that embodiment.”).
97. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting).
98. Peter Zura, Looking For Fire Amidst The Smoke - Is The Federal
Circuit Really Exceeding Its Appellate Authority In Patent Infringement
Cases?, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 15 (2003).
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some express reasoning from the PTO.
V. SOLUTION
The above-described problems highlight the need for a
solution that will stabilize the courts’ application of written
description. The solution would most preferably align with the
existing evidentiary framework that requires a challenger to
disprove the PTO’s findings by clear and convincing evidence.
A solution to this problem—and one that puts the issue of
written description squarely back before the PTO, where the
issue should be evaluated in the first place—is for applicants to
affirmatively identify the written description support for their
claims in the application and for the PTO to either approve or
question the applicant’s statement of support. In this way, the
PTO will necessarily provide a factual finding at the conclusion
of prosecution, thus providing express reasoning to which
courts may accord proper deference when a patent is
challenged in litigation.99
Asking applicants to identify support in their specification
in prosecution has precedent. More specifically, an applicant
who appeals a final rejection to the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences (BPAI) must identify for the BPAI where the
specification provides support for the claims on appeal.100 There
is already rule-based support for this proposal. Title 37, section
1.56 of the C.F.R. already requires that “[e]ach individual
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with
the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the [PTO] all
information known to that individual to be material to
patentability.”101 Given the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112
and the recent reaffirmation of the use of the written
description requirement to police the “support” for new claims,
it is difficult to imagine any information more “material” to the
written description requirement for patentability than
99. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359–60
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
100. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(v) (2010) (requiring that an appellant’s opening
brief to the BPAI include a “concise explanation of the subject matter defined
in each of the independent claims involved in the appeal, which shall refer to
the specification by page and line number, and to the drawing[s], if any, by
reference characters”).
101. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2010).
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identification of the support for the claims at issue.
A. BENEFITS
By requiring applicants to affirmatively identify those
sections of their specification and drawings that describe their
claimed invention, the proposed solution brings more
consistency and predictability to the patent process at both the
prosecution and litigation stages. This yields benefits to patent
applicants, patentees, and the public.
First, the solution stands to reduce the number of
overbroad patents. In a regime where an applicant must—from
the outset of prosecution—identify the support for her claims,
applicants will take care (1) to draft complete disclosures and
(2) draft claims that are congruent with that disclosure. Patent
applicants will be less likely to try and overreach with their
claims because if they do, the applicants will have to justify—
during prosecution—how and why their claims are supported.
With more patents being aligned to their disclosures, fewer
patents with overbroad claims will result. This represents a
positive outcome for the public, as there is a cost to society from
overbroad patents.102
A second benefit to patent applicants is that, once a patent
is issued, the prosecution history of the patent will include
express reasoning by the PTO on the issue of written
description. This will in turn provide the courts with a PTO
analysis to which the courts can more easily defer, as the PTO’s
express reasoning will act as a psychological guidepost to
courts.103 From the patent applicant’s perspective, this is a
positive result, as applicants-turned-patentees will have more
security that their patents will be accorded the proper respect
in litigation. This will in turn encourage technology firms to
seek patent protection, as they will have new confidence that a
patent granted by the PTO will stand up to a litigation
challenge.
Having applicants provide a statement of written
102. See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing A Glove On The Invisible
Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May Impede Innovation In Energy
Research And Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 406 (2008)
(“Strong broad patent rights entail major economic costs while generating
insufficient additional social benefits”) (citing Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R.
Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to
the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 281 (1998)).
103. Am. Hoist., 725 F.2d at 1360 .
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description support to the PTO at the outset of prosecution is
analogous to having applicants self-police. For self-policing to
be effective, the actor in question must have a “positive
incentive” to self-police.104 The proposed solution provides such
a positive incentive: in return for self-policing and supplying
the PTO with an affirmative statement of written description
support, applicants will receive patents that are stronger in
their written description compliance than under the current
system. A litigant who challenges a patent must show where
the PTO erred,105 and it will be more difficult to demonstrate
such an error when the PTO has reviewed the applicant’s own
affirmative representation of where support for the patent
claims is found in the specification.
The proposed solution also applies the emerging theory of
behavioral economics106 to patent law. Under the behavior
economics approach, actors are administratively “nudged” or
otherwise impelled toward behaviors that ultimately benefit
them. As one example of such an approach, employees may be
automatically enrolled in a particular retirement plan so as to
ensure that they save for retirement; employees who must
affirmatively choose among multiple plans frequently fail to
elect any plan and consequently save far less money for their
retirements.107
The proposed solution likewise nudges patent applicants
toward a beneficial behavior by having applicants positively
identify as part of the application process the location or
locations in their specification that support their claimed
invention. In this way, a minor adjustment to the patent
application process stands to reduce the number of overbroad
patents (conversely increasing the unclaimed subject matter
available to others for further research) and reduce the number
of granted patents that are invalidated during litigation.
Applicants will then have greater confidence in the written
description strength of their patents, which will in turn bring
more predictability to invalidity challenges in patent litigation.
104. Jay P. Kesan, Symposium: Innovations in Environmental Policy:
Encouraging Firms to Police Them-Selves: Strategic Prescriptions to Promote
Corporate Self-Auditing, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 155, 162 (2000).
105. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360 .
106. See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE (2004);
CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE (2008).
107. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 27–29.
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B. OBJECTIONS
There are some objections to this proposed solution. First,
the proposed solution may slow prosecution and make
prosecution more costly.108 While applicants will undoubtedly
bristle at the prospect of increased prosecution costs, that
additional cost brings with it patents that should more easily
withstand written description challenges in litigation.
Second, patent examiners are already overburdened.109
Tasking examiners with making express findings on written
description in every case will undoubtedly increase that
burden. But unless the PTO plans to hire additional examiners,
this extra burden will be the trade-off for higher quality
patents.
Another objection is that the solution may cause inventors
to limit themselves to patent claims drawn narrowly to the
examples in the specification or to claim less than they could
have, out of caution or out of interest in speeding prosecution.
This objection need not prevent implementation of the proposed
solution.
First, while asking applicants to affirmatively identify the
written description support for their claims could lead some
applicants to narrow their claims, that is the choice of those
applicants. Applicants who desire broader claims can simply
draft an accordingly broad specification. Further, if an
applicant receives patent claims she believes are narrower than
the claims to which she believes she was entitled, the applicant
can file a broadening reissue patent to secure the previously
unclaimed subject matter.110
Second, the concern that applicants’ claims will be limited
to the embodiments of their invention that may be described in
the “Examples” section of the patent application is misplaced
because the law allows for claims that are broader than the
examples. For example, in the chemical world, the Federal
Circuit concluded en banc that a claim to a genus is proper
when the specification “disclos[es] either a representative
number of species falling within the scope of the genus or
structural features common to the members of the genus so
that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the
108. Sovacool, supra note 102, at 398.
109. E.g., Devlin, supra note 5, at 334–45.
110. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006); Tillotson, Ltd. v. Walbro Corp., 831 F.2d 1033,
1037 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also MPEP § 1412.03.
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members of the genus.”111 Thus, even under the proposed
written description scheme, an applicant need not limit her
claims to the examples set forth in their specification.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
While the written description requirement is barely an
afterthought during patent prosecution,112 the fact that the
requirement makes frequent and important appearances
during litigation underscores the need to align the courts’
application of the doctrine during litigation with the PTO’s
application of the doctrine during prosecution.113
Proper application of the written description doctrine is
challenging. First, the Federal Circuit’s development of the law
surrounding the written description requirement has been
turbulent114 and—in the view of some of the court’s own
judges—is inconsistent with other areas of the court’s
jurisprudence.115 Thus, the contours of the legal test for written
description are ever-evolving.116 The proper level of deference to
grant to the PTO’s written description conclusion and the
evidentiary burden that the patent challenger must carry to
invalidate a patent on written description grounds are also
complex and difficult to apply.117
But if applicants and the PTO are empowered to
affirmatively frame and resolve written description issues at
the earliest possible stage during prosecution, patentees could
secure patents that are more likely to withstand litigation
challenges. Having applicants affirmatively set forth their
111. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559,
1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
112. Crouch, supra note 8, at 396.
113. See supra Part IV.
114. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle &
Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting); MOBA,
B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Rader, J., concurring); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956,
976, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting) (criticizing application of
written description requirement).
115. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361–67 (Rader, J., dissenting); LizardTech, 433
F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
116. See supra Part II.C.
117. See supra Part III.
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written description support during prosecution would achieve
this, as well as reduce the number of potentially harmful
overbroad patents by encouraging applicants to align their
patent claims with their specification at the earliest possible
stage of the patent process.
Introducing affirmative claim support statements into
prosecution may not be a perfect remedy. The PTO is
undeniably overburdened, and adding additional analysis to
the patent prosecution process will not reduce that burden.
Drafting affirmative statements of written description support
may also increase prosecution costs for applicants. But a
patenting process that produces solid patents and properly
manages patentees’ expectations is worth investment from both
the PTO and patent applicants.

